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We document the cumulative change in expressions of support
for Social Security's social insurance ideals to privatization,from
the late 1970s through 2007. Social Security's basic structure and
principles generally were supported by the United States govern-
ment and in amendments to the original Act of 1935. However, in
the 1980s market arguments began to proliferate in government
alongside pension privatization projects by international gov-
ernmental organizations and conservative think tanks. Although
in 1983 Commission members concluded "the Social Security
system is sound in principle.. and... structure," four members
wrote a supplemental statement that emphasized market rational-
ism. By 1994 dissension in Congress was apparent. The history
of Social Security privatization reveals an increasing ideological
alignment on the political agenda among transnational organiza-
tions, financial institutions, conservative think tanks, Congress,
Presidents, and the Social Security Commission and Board of
Trustees. Our research denotes the ideological alignments that
formed thefoundation for a politically motivated social movement.
Keywords: Social Security, privatization, ideology, politics, social
movements, social policy, policy analysis, Social Movement Theory
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Social Security was enacted in 1935 amid political contro-
versy (Amenta, 2006; Domhoff, 1996). Until the passage of the
Social Security Act amendments of 1950, Republicans, conser-
vatives and corporate leaders opposed the program, decrying
it as burdensome to business, workers, and the state as well as
an unfair liability on future generations. Yet, from 1950 through
1995, Congress and presidents generally agreed that the fun-
damental structure and principles of Social Security should be
retained. Consensus politics continued through two periods of
Republican majority control over the Democrats in Congress
(1953 through 1955 and 1980 through 1986), but dissension
began to mount when Republican majorities ruled both houses
in 1994. We contend that the dissension is the result of an ideo-
logical social movement favoring privatization.
Social movements are social processes wherein actors,
linked by dense informal networks and sharing a distinct iden-
tity, are engaged in collective action against clearly identified
opponents (della Porta & Diani, 2006; Diani & Bison, 2004).
Social movement actors include individuals and organizations
that engage in sustained resource exchanges with the purpose
of achieving common goals, while at the same time remain-
ing autonomous and independent. The actors, based on their
shared ideals, collectively resist or promote change in the po-
litical, economic and/or cultural status quo. Since the 1960s,
social movement scholars have studied four major questions
related to structure, culture, resource mobilization and political
opportunity: 1) what is the structural context within which the
social movement developed; 2) how have the actors defined
the social problem and what symbols have they created to
substantiate collective action; 3) what were the available re-
sources that made the social movement possible; and 4) what
is the interaction between the social movement and the politi-
cal system.
Questions 2 and 3 above have been analyzed by research-
ers. Scholars have documented the flow of resources among
individuals, foundations, organizations, government institu-
tions, and media in support of conservative (hence market)
ideals that include privatization of public programs (e.g. Brock,
2004; Callahan, 1999; Covington, 1997; Krehel?, House, &
Kernan, 2004; Media Transparency, 2004; Medvetz, 2006; Rich,
2001; Smith, 1991; Stefanicic & Delgado, 1996). Social Security
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has been framed by conservative think tanks, members of
Congress, and others in conferences, journals, reports and the
media as being insolvent, in crisis, unsustainable, a bad deal for
workers, inequitable among generations, and requiring radical
reform (Baker & Weisbrot, 1999; Estes, 1991; 2001; Fairness and
Accuracy in Reporting (FAIR), 2005; Lieberman, 2000; Pryce &
Santorum, 2005; White, 2003). A key framing tactic has been
the strategic redefinition of Social Security "privatization" to
"personalization" or "personal accounts," to suggest increased
personal ownership and control instead of connoting corpo-
rate takeover. The refraining provides opponents of Social
Security with a conceptual tag that maintains a semblance of
consistency between their ideology and actions for reform.
Our research on the existence of a social movement within the
Social Security policy domain focuses on: a) investigating the
historical context within which the Social Security privatiza-
tion efforts developed; and b) tracking the interaction between
the reform efforts and the political system.
In the first section of the paper we describe our method-
ology-an historical and legislative content analyses. In the
second section we trace the structural context of the Social
Security program through a brief background on Social Security
Advisory Boards and Councils as well as an abridged history
of legislative and executive action from the program's incep-
tion in 1935 through 1992. We track the interaction between
the reform efforts and the political system in sections three
and four. In section three we document the change in politi-
cal atmosphere in the early 1980s that coincided with the re-
appearance of long-term solvency issues and the ideological
shift toward market rationalism within international and na-
tional organizations. Subsequently, we illustrate the political
shifts within government through Trustees' reports, Council
and Commission recommendations, Congressional hearings,
and Presidential positions. We conclude with a discussion
of the current status of privatization in national and interna-
tional organizations, and the legislative and administrative
government.
Methods
We combined two frameworks to analyze the presence of
an ideologically structured social movement for Social Security
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reform. Seven tenets from the work of McAdam, Tarrow and
Tilly (2001) framed our search for mobilization efforts:
1. visible and perceived opportunities for reform
(if we perceived an opportunity and the challengers
appeared to act upon it, we included it as a visible and
perceived opportunity)
2. appropriation of new or pre-existing sites to house
reform efforts (the organizations used to challenge
support for Social Security as a social insurance
program)
3. interactive framing of disputes among challengers
and supporters of Social Security, elements of the
state, third parties and the media (ideas and values
that are used to promote reform and are incorporated
into rhetoric, slogans, metaphors, myths, causes, and
to define heroes, villains, and victims-previous and
future studies)
4. interaction among collective action repertoires
that are used as a resource by challengers of the Social
Security program
5. episodes of contention that signal mobilization
processes and which can be distinguished from routine
politics
6. mechanisms in trajectories of contention that pro-
duce processes of polarization, including: competition
for power, diffusion of information, repression of
action or groups, and radical agendas (the expansion
of collective action frames such as "crises" to more
extreme agendas such as cutting or limiting entitlement
programs)
7. mechanisms that bridge ideological divides and
deter competition (brokerage) or drive opposing actors
together to oppose common threats (radical flank
effects)
Our examination of the impact challengers might have
had on Social Security was framed by the three-level approach
of Edwin Amenta (2006). We asked whether the challengers
achieved:
1. a win or concession from supporters of the Social
Security program
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2. structural reform that provided greater leverage
over the political process, such as through legislation,
government communications, or positions of power
3. gains in rights of entitlement
To track the development of market rationalism within
the Social Security policy domain, we: a) compiled congres-
sional and administrative documents, journal articles, reports
on the privatization of public pensions internationally, and
documents from think tank websites; b) systematically docu-
mented the on-line historical database of the Social Security
Administration (SSA) pertaining to legislative action, presiden-
tial speeches, and trustee and commission reports; c) perused
historical accounts to identify information on Social Security
and international pension reform (e.g. Altman, 2005; Amenta,
2006; Andrews, 2006; Ball, 2000; Beland, 2005; Deacon, 2000;
Domhoff, 1996; Gill, Packard, & Yermo, 2004; International
Monetary Fund, 2005; James, 1994; Light, 1995; Schieber &
Shoven, 1999; Skidmore, 1999; World Bank, 2001); d) searched
the CQ Weekly on-line database for legislative information
and action under the subject heading Social Security; e) at-
tended conferences on public pensions (Federal Reserve Bank
of Atlanta, 2006) and Social Security (National Academy of
Social Insurance, 2006); and f) researched legislative hearings
(Svihula & Estes, 2007).
Structural Context
Although market arguments have been part of the leg-
islative debate since Social Security's inception, the social
insurance principles and structure of the program have sur-
vived many amendments (Kollman & Solomon-Fears, 2001).
However, recent expressions supporting privatization have
been emanating from the President and Congress. This section
denotes the institutions, social relations, social definitions, and
axioms that pre-date the privatization efforts.
Advisor ! Boards and Councils
From its inception in 1935 until 1994, the Social Security
program was served by an Advisory Council (Council) com-
posed primarily of non-government members who were
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appointed every four years. The members were to represent
the public at large in advising government officials on Social
Security policy. Under 1994 law, a permanent seven-member
advisory board was formed to serve many of the same func-
tions (DeWitt, 2003). In 1939 a Board of Trustees (Board) was
established to oversee the Social Security Trust fund. The
Board comprises six members (Trustees), four of whom are
from the federal government: the Secretary of the Treasury
(the managing trustee), the Secretary of the Department of
Labor, the Secretary of Health and Human Services, and the
Commissioner of Social Security. The other two members are
appointed to four year terms by the President and confirmed
by the Senate. The Trustees' report is politically significant in
that it estimates Social Security's short- and long-term finances
(Light, 1995; Wayne, 2005a).
The Social Security Program from Inception through 1992
Political consensus in support of Social Security persisted
from 1950 until 1994 (Amenta, 2006). Trustees, commissions,
presidents and Congress supported the program's basic struc-
ture and principles in recommendations and amendments they
made to the original Act. Major amendments to the program
were expansionist until short-term financing problems ap-
peared in 1977 resulting in increases in the Social Security
tax rates as well as the taxable earnings base (Cooper, 2004;
DeWitt, 2001). Additionally, a basic flaw in the benefit com-
putation formula was corrected to reduce long-term financing
problems.
In December 1977, Congress created a nine-member, bi-par-
tisan National Commission (Commission) on Social Security. It
directed the Commission to undertake a "fundamental, long-
term, comprehensive consideration for change in the entire
Social Security system" and to develop a "policy blueprint
for the kind of system that would best serve the Nation in
the future" (SSA, 1981, p. 1). After extensive study-includ-
ing public hearings, meetings with scholars, public opinion
polls, and international research-the Commission concluded
that the Social Security system was sound in principle and the
best of all alternatives for "stable income support, especially
in times of economic adversity." Other alternatives would
be "too costly or offer insufficient assurance" that workers'
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income would be there when they needed it" (1981, pp. 3-4).
Even so, in their supplemental statement, members Laxson,
MacNaughton, Myers, and Rodgers recommended that the
nation should forestall generational conflict by limiting inter-
generational transfers that protect citizens against insufficient
income and adversity. Conversely, members Cohen, Duskin,
and Miller concluded that Social Security was not at the brink
of disaster and that the nation could continue to support Social
Security because "even with fixed resources, we still have the
option of deciding how those resources will be divided among
competing uses" (SSA, 1981, p. 20).
The last major amendments to the Act occurred in 1983.
Legislative changes with the greatest impact on long range
financing included: a) covering nonprofit and new federal
employees; b) taxing benefits for higher-income recipients; c)
shifting COLAs to a calendar-year basis; d) revising the tax
rate schedule; e) increasing the tax basis for self-employed in-
dividuals; and f) raising the full benefit retirement age from 65
to 67, gradually phasing-in the increase in age over the years
2000 through 2027. President Reagan stated upon signing the
amendments that the program "must be preserved," and that
the 1983 amendments guaranteed Social Security benefits and
reaffirmed the government's commitment to the program
(SSA, 1984). The Trustees reported the system was in balance
for both the short and long term, with the balance beyond 75
years reflecting a slight surplus (Office of the Actuary, 1983).
It was not until 1988 that the Trustees again estimated that
the Social Security program failed to meet the 75-year, long-
range test for actuarial balance. In 1991 and 1992 the Trustees,
based on a new and more stringent test of financial adequacy,
recommended the development of long-term financing options
(SSA, 1996a). Yet despite the reappearance of long-term fi-
nancing issues, President G. H. W. Bush was "not prepared to
endorse" changes to the Social Security program. He indicated
that the government would stand behind its social contract
with its citizens, stating " [W]e have firm Government credit to
guarantee the pensions..." (SSA, 1990).
In sum, the Social Security boards and councils were es-
tablished to represent the public and secure benefits through
stable program financing. The amendments through 1983 reaf-
firmed the government's commitment to guaranteeing stable
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social insurance income for its current and future citizens.
Through 1995, trustees, commissions, presidents and Congress
supported the program's social insurance structure and prin-
ciples, and while some considered privatization and means
testing, the majority believed that the program was structur-
ally sound and the best alternative of income support for the
United States.
Political Opportunities: The Global
and National Shift toward Pension Privatization
Theorists (e.g. Kreisi, 1996; McAdam, 1996; Tarrow, 1998;
Tilly, 1978) stress the importance of expanding political oppor-
tunities as stimulus to collective action. McAdam, Tarrow, and
Tilly (2001) reason that: a) the prospects for collective action are
subject to the political context and challengers' perception of
manifest opportunities or threats; and b) the form movements
take depends on challengers' appropriation of sites for mobi-
lization. Within the climate of the Great Depression, President
Roosevelt recognized the need for political action. Owners and
managers of capital were persuaded to accept government in-
tervention, in the form of pensions and unemployment insur-
ance, with the hope that it would stabilize the social system.
The Social Security Act (Act) legislation of 1935 emerged from
the efforts of many actors (for further discussion see Amenta,
2006; Domhoff, 1996).
The popularity of government spending to improve the
economy (known as Keynesian economics) declined with
the stagflation and unemployment of the 1970s (Baker, 2007;
Myles, 1984). The post-Keynesian political economy appears
to have emboldened economists and others to promote market
ideals, including the privatization of public pensions. Milton
Freidman, a former Keynesian economist, lectured on the idea
of free markets in his visits to Chile and China (Commanding
Heights, 2000). President Reagan sent U.S. Treasury Secretary
James Baker, III to promote market reforms at the annual
meeting of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World
Bank (WB). U.S. think tanks, international organizations, and
other witnesses expressed increasing support for privatization
at federal hearings (Svihula & Estes, 2007). We elaborate on the
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proliferation of market ideals in the following paragraphs.
In the 1980s, the period of Reaganomics and Thatcherism,
market rationalism became preeminent in global affairs under
the influence of the IMF and the WB (Beland, 2005; Estes,
1991; Estes & Philipson, 2003). This contrasted with the origi-
nal roles for the international institutions established in 1944
by members of the Bretton Woods Conference. The members
had established the WB for reconstruction after World War II,
and the IMF for ensuring global economic stability based on
recognition that markets fail and collective action is needed
at the global level (Committee and the Department of the
State, 1950). By the mid-1980s, however, the IMF promoted
free market ideals through its criteria for the use of emergency
funds and the WB provided loans based on fulfillment of IMF
preconditions (Williamson, 2000).
In 1981, Chile, the leader in privatizing public pensions,
converted its defined benefit pay-as-you-go scheme to a fully
pre-funded personal pension account system run by private
fund management. The pension conversion was stimulated
by the theories of Milton Friedman and Friedrich von Hayek,
faculty at the University of Chicago (Elahi, 1986; Silva, 1991).
Their proteges, post-graduates of the University of Chicago
School of Economics generally advocated widespread de-
regulation, privatization, and other free market policies. Jos6
Pifiera, a Harvard economist trained under the tutelage of
Milton Friedman, was the architect of Chile's pension priva-
tization (Pifiera, n.d.). Due to its veto power, the U.S. govern-
ment was complicit with the IMF and WB in making market
reforms a precondition of loans to Chile (Elahi, 1986).
The Reagan administration viewed IMF preconditions
as insufficient and pushed to tighten them (Boughton, 2001).
James Baker, III, a key player in the Greenspan Commission
and Secretary of the U.S. Treasury, introduced market reforms,
including privatization, to the IMF and WB at their 1985 annual
meeting in Seoul, Korea (Williamson, 2000). The Baker Plan
broadened IMF preconditions to include structural measures
aimed at strengthening a nation's basis for economic growth
(Boughton, 2001). The IMF directors gave the official stamp of
approval to the Baker Plan on November 13, and on December
2 the WB and IMF issued a joint press release expressing their
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"strong support" for the initiative (p. 424). Subsequently, the
WB has supported pension privatization, most importantly in
a 1994 report, "Averting the Old Age Crisis," which has been
influential worldwide as a blueprint for pension reform. From
1984 through 2004 the WB provided 204 loans to 68 countries
that included mandatory, privately managed pension compo-
nents (Andrews, 2006; James, 1994; World Bank, 2001).
In the U.S., the idea of private accounts did not become
prevalent until proponents organized and strategically took
the idea into the public policy arena. The movement had roots
in a book called Social Security: The Inherent Contradiction,
sponsored by the Cato Institute (Cato) and authored by Peter
Ferrara (1980), who suggested converting Social Security into
private investments. Three years later Cato published an article,
"Achieving a 'Leninist' Strategy," co-authored by affiliates of
the Heritage Foundation (Heritage) that called for "guerrilla
warfare against both the current Social Security system and
the coalition that supports it" by creating "a focused politi-
cal coalition" to isolate and weaken its opponents (Butler &
Germanis, 1983, p. 547). The concept debuted nationally when
Pierre du Pont, IV (R-Del.) called for private accounts during
his 1988 presidential campaign (Birnbaum, 2005). The idea
gained support in the financial services industry with William
Shipman of State Street Global Advisors, who, after testifying
before Congress in 1994, was recruited by Cato to co-chair its
Social Security project.
From the 1980s onward supporters of Social Security priva-
tization, such as Peter Ferrara, Barber Conable, Pierre du Pont,
and members of conservative think tanks, were prominent
in national and international politics and government. Peter
Ferrara served in the Reagan administration from 1981 to 1983
and was made associate deputy attorney general by President
G. H. W. Bush in 1991. In 2003, Ferrara presented one of the
major privatization plans to Congress (Weisman, 2005). Barber
Conable, former congressman and member of the 1983 Social
Security Commission, became president of the WB in 1986
(Andrews, 2006). Du Pont, who received the acclaim of Milton
Friedman, advised President Reagan and Congress and was
a consultant to Prime Minister Thatcher (National Center for
Policy Analysis, n.d.). Of the five members of the 1994-1996
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Advisory Council who supported private accounts, Sylvester
Schieber, a vice-president at Watson Wyatt Worldwide (Watson
Wyatt), a transnational financial consulting firm, is Co-chair
of Cato's Project on Social Security Choice (formerly Project
on Social Security Privatization). Another member, Carolyn
Weaver, Director of Social Security and Pension Studies at the
American Enterprise Institute (AEI) authored "Social Security:
Has the Crisis Passed?" in the 1979 Cato Policy Report (Altman,
2005; Weaver, 1979).
More recently, six members of the 2001 President's
Commission to Strengthen Social Security were affiliated with
conservative think tanks, three with Cato (SSA, 2001). Richard
Parsons, Commission Co-chair and CEO of AOL/Time Warner,
donated to the Bush-Cheney campaign (Brock, 2004). Daniel
Patrick Moynihan, the other Co-chair and Senior Scholar at
Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, advocated
for a complete pay-as-you-go system with substantial benefit
cuts and partial privatization. David C. John, Research Fellow
at Heritage, has explained the president's proposals to the
public, lawmakers and media and debated Bush's opponents.
Andrew Biggs, Assistant Director of Cato's Project on Social
Security Choice and associate commissioner of the SSA, has ac-
companied the President in his private accounts quest (Wayne,
2005a). Cato, the Center for Strategic and International Studies
(CSIS), AEI and Heritage are leaders among the think tanks in
the U.S. that continue to consistently promote pension priva-
tization through events and publications (for more detail see
American Enterprise Institute, 2005; Cato, 2003; Center for
Strategic and International Studies, 2005; Heritage Foundation,
2005; John, 2003; n.d.; Tanner, 2004).
Changes Within Government
Concurrent with international and national ideological
shifts toward neoliberalism and globalization from the early
1980s onward, greater attention was being given to private ac-
counts by members of the Board, Council and Commission, and
President G. W. Bush. They utilized Social Security financial
forecasts to articulate the need for reform in order to solve the
impending "crisis" (Estes, 2001; Light, 1995). In 1993, during
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President Clinton's first term, the Trustees recommended that
the 13-member Advisory Council develop recommendations
for restoring Social Security's long-range actuarial balance.
Although noting that privatization would require addition-
al adjustments beyond what would be required to achieve
system solvency, the Technical Panel to the Council concluded
that private accounts deserved additional study (SSA, 1996b).
In 1995, the Secretary of Health and Human Services di-
rected the Council to conduct an extensive review of Social
Security and develop recommendations for restoring long-
range actuarial balance to the program (SSA, 1995). Because
there was minimal political support for increasing payroll
taxes, the Council recommended other ways to address the fi-
nancing issue, including increasing income to the system and
changes in benefits. Three different plans, two of which in-
cluded private accounts, were recommended in January 1997:
Maintenance of Benefits, Individual Accounts, and Personal
Security Accounts. Five of the 13 members supported carve-
out accounts and two members supported add-on accounts.
Carve-out accounts would draw from existing payroll tax
revenues and would reduce or offset Social Security benefits;
whereas add-ons would supplement the program benefits
with new revenue streams. This was the first time in the pro-
gram's history that consensus was absent among the Council
members.
From 1998 forward, the Social Security Trustees continual-
ly reported that the Social Security Fund was not in long-term
actuarial balance, placing greater emphasis as time passed on
the importance of making changes to the program (DeWitt,
2001; SSA, 1996b; n.d.). In their 2003 through 2006 reports, the
Trustees also emphasized the need for creative thinking and
consideration of the welfare of future generations. In 2005 and
2006 the Trustees' projected insolvency dates grew closer and
the costs to offset the estimated deficit increased (SSA, 2005a,
2006a).
Heightened attention was focused on Social Security
reform during the Clinton Administration when Republicans
gained control of both houses of Congress. President Clinton
did not support privatization of Social Security via carve-
out accounts. In his 1998 State of the Union address, he em-
phasized the importance of addressing the solvency of the
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Social Security program by stating that the budget surplus
should be used to "Save Social Security First" (SSA, 1998a).
That February, President Clinton unofficially launched the
year-long process of discussing the future of Social Security
at Georgetown University in Washington, D.C. In April,
President Clinton participated in the first of his national
forums on Social Security co-hosted by AARP and the Concord
Coalition (Office of the Press Secretary, 1998). In the midst of
the forums, the CSIS National Commission on Retirement
Policy (1998) issued a report that recommended, among other
changes, diverting 2% of Social Security payroll taxes into indi-
vidual savings accounts. On December 8 and 9, 1998, President
Clinton convened participants in Washington, D.C. at the first-
ever White House Conference on Social Security to discuss the
program's long-range financing (SSA, 1999). Approximately
270 guests were invited and over 100 submitted statements,
many in support of privatization. In his January 1999 State
of the Union Address, President Clinton presented his pro-
posal, which included government investment of 12% of the
trust fund surpluses into the stock market to create universal
savings accounts as add-ons to Social Security benefits. Hoping
to increase retirees' standard of living and boost the nation-
al economy, President Clinton signed the Senior Citizens'
Freedom to Work Act of 2000, which eliminated the retirement
earnings test for beneficiaries at or above the normal retire-
ment age.
During George W. Bush's presidential campaign in 2000,
he proposed allowing 2% of Social Security payroll taxes to
be diverted into voluntary private accounts. President Bush
promised to reform Social Security in his inaugural address,
and in the middle of his first year as president he formed the
President's Commission to Strengthen Social Security to study
Social Security reform. For the first time since the program's
inception, Commission members were appointed based on
their acceptance of a president's injunction to include private
accounts in their recommendations (SSA, 2001). On December
11, 2001 the Commission recommended three possible
scenarios on how Social Security's long-range financing might
be addressed (President's Commission to Strengthen Social
Security, 2001). Largely because of the strong preference of the
commission appointees for carve-out accounts, which would
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destabilize Social Security finances faster than predicted under
current law, the three plans they recommended have received
little recognition.
President Bush again promoted privatization through
his national agenda after his 2004 reelection (2004a). He has
continuously advanced private accounts through multiple
venues including radio addresses, the Department of Treasury
fact sheets, conversations with the public, SSA personnel ap-
pointments, changes to telephone messages, publications,
and benefit statements (Bush, 2004b; Office of Public Affairs,
2004; Office of the Press Secretary, 2005; Pear, 2005; SSA, 2004,
2005b). The Minority Staff Special Investigations Division
(SID) of the House of Representatives investigated the SSA's
alteration of public communications in support of President
Bush's Social Security privatization proposals (Minority Staff
Special Investigations Division Committee on Government
Reform, 2005). The documents revealed that the SSA "mark-
edly changed its communications to the public over the last
four years.. Public assurances that the Social Security system
faces 'no immediate crisis' [were] eliminated from agency pre-
sentations, and descriptions of the role Social Security plays in
keeping seniors 'out of poverty' [were] dropped." The agency
now repeatedly warns that Social Security is "unsustainable"
and "underfinanced" and "must change" (p. 3). The SID also
found that the SSA's primary strategic goal of educating the
public about the program was replaced in 2003 by a new ob-
jective to use public communication to "support reforms" to
Social Security (Minority Staff Special Investigations Division
Committee on Government Reform, 2005, p. 2). In 2005, the
communication plan states that a key "message" is "Social
Security's long-term financing problems are serious and need
to be addressed soon" (p. 3).
Alteration of public communication on Social Security
is not limited to the SSA. For example, a Department of
the Treasury Office of Public Affairs Fact Sheet declares,
"This Administration embraces the need for new ideas. The
creation of personal accounts is critical to ensure Social
Security's sustainability." Additionally, the chairs of the House
and Senate Republican Conferences developed a 103-page
guide in January, 2005 to educate Republicans on how to
promote private accounts in Social Security (Pryce & Santorum,
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2005).
Some have claimed that President Bush's agenda for Social
Security is dead (Barshay & Wayne, 2005). Although privatiza-
tion was first on the agenda for Mr. Bush at the beginning of
his second term, voters disagreed with the president's agenda,
Democrats rejected it, and Republicans were split on the idea
(NBC News Polling the Nations, 2004; Wayne, 2006a). Yet
without advance comment or consulting Congress, President
Bush inserted estimated expenditures to fund Social Security
private accounts in his 2007 budget, and while Congress was
on recess in 2006 he reappointed two public trustees (John L.
Palmer and Thomas R. Saving) [Center on Budget and Policy
Priorities, 2006; Office of the Press Secretary, 2007; Schor, 2007;
Wayne, 2005c, 2006b]. The appointees are known to support
Social Security privatization. Palmer and Saving contributed
to the 2006 Board report that predicted Social Security insol-
vency a year earlier than in the 2005 report, and two years
earlier than in the 2004 report. The 2006 Board report con-
tains the same assumptions as the 2005 report (Baker, 2006;
Munnell, 2006). However, in the both the 2005 and 2006 reports
the Board assumed that productivity growth and the pace of
annual immigration would be much slower than in earlier ac-
tuarial assumptions and in other government agencies' projec-
tions, such as those of the Congressional Budget Office and
Office of Management and Budget (Baker, 2006). The changed
assumptions produce a reduction in the years of full solvency.
The insolvency date is important, as Board and Commission
predictions have influenced the perceived necessity for and
direction of Social Security reform, as well as acted as a politi-
cal shield for Congress (Light, 1995; Wayne, 2005c). Moreover,
David C. John has advised the Trustees that they could issue a
special public report explaining why Social Security reform is
necessary (2003).
Congressional policymakers have been actively pursu-
ing private accounts from 1993 onward. As shown in Figure
1, most witnesses invited by Congress to federal hearings on
Social Security reform between January 1, 1993 and December
31, 2003 supported private accounts (Svihula, 2005). Think tank
members represented the majority of the witnesses, and inter-
national organizations included Watson Wyatt, State Street,
and WB (Svihula & Estes, 2007).
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Figure 1. Witnesses' expressions of support for private retirement
accounts in federal legislative hearings on Social Security reform,
1993-2003.
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The SSA web site lists 26 Social Security proposals ad-
dressing the program's long-term solvency from August 2001
through March 2006 (2006b). Just four of the 26 proposals did
not include some form of carve-out accounts; one of the four
involved progressive indexing of benefits based on income.
The proposals supporting individual accounts include that
of Rep. Sam Johnson (R-Texas), who had conceptualized the
formation of the Cato Institute (Wayne, 2005d). The proposals
have heightened discussion on private accounts. While none
have been passed into law, Jim McCrery (former Republican
Chairman Subcommittee on Social Security, Committee on
Ways and Means, U.S. House of Representatives) predicted
that Social Security reform would appear on the Congressional
agenda after the 2006 elections and Grover Norquist (GOP
strategist) predicted that "W accounts" will emerge after G. W.
Bush has left the presidency (Barshay & Wayne, 2005; Marshall,
2006).
In summary, political opportunities for Social Security
privatization commenced internationally through a global
network of U.S. policymakers (see Table 1). While Social
Security privatization was refuted in the U.S. through the
1980s, the free market theories of Milton Friedman were em-
ployed to press the Chilean authorities to fully privatize their
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public pension scheme. With the support of President Reagan's
administration and under the leadership of Treasury Secretary
James Baker, III, transnational governmental organizations
(IMF and WB) promoted and enforced pension privatization in a
number of countries through their funding policies. Welcomed
by the Republican majority, international proponents of Social
Security privatization (e.g. James, Peterson, Pifiera, Scheiber,
Shipman) became prominent in national politics and govern-
ment alongside members of conservative think tanks such as
Cato, CSIS, AEI and Heritage (e.g. Biggs, Feldstein, Ferrara,
John, Tanner) [Svihula & Estes, 2007]. With the Republicans
in control of Congress since 1994 and a Republican president
inaugurated in 2001, proponents of privatization became more
deeply entrenched throughout the president's administration,
in the SSA, and in the Social Security commissions and board
of trustees. President G. W. Bush has placed Social Security
reform high on his national agenda. Political mediation con-
tinues through linkages with the transnational financial ser-
vices industry through the relentless promotion of writings,
conferences, and media content produced by conservative
think tanks and by access to and influence on the federal issue
agenda through legislative hearings.
Two areas of research would enhance our ability to predict
the direction of ideological social movements and be a great
contribution to fields such as the politics of aging, policy anal-
ysis, political sociology and political science: a) an historical
exegesis of the refraining, or "keying" (Goffman, 1974), associ-
ated with the terminology for reform (e.g. privatization, private
accounts, individual accounts, personal accounts) could signal
ideological alignments; and b) a longitudinal network analysis
of the actors, their ideologies and resources could clarify how
dominant interests in the Social Security policy domain are
able to use their power and relationships to influence policy
options.
Discussion
We contend that the Social Security reform efforts are a
substantial component of an ideological social movement. The
decade that comprised the late 1970s through the late 1980s
brought about a shift in political and economic consciousness.
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Table 1. An historical account of ideological action among actors
that favors Social Security privatization and connotes a politically
motivated social movement.
Date Actor(s)
4 SS1977 S
Commissioners
1978 Milton Friedman
1978 ChicagoBoys/Pifiera
1980 Cato/Ferrara
1980 IMF/WB/US
1981 Ferrara
1981 Jose Pifnera
1983 SS Commissioners
1983 Pierre du Pont
1983 Cato/Heritage
1985 Reagan/ Baker, III
1985 IMF/WB
1986 Conable
1988 Pierre duPont
1988 Trustees /Council
1991 Ferrara
1993 Congress
1994 Shipman/StateStreet
1994 James/WB
Tech Panel to SS
Council
1995 Secretary of HTHS
1995 Trustees
Action(s)
Supplemental statements emphasize market values
Free market speech in Chile
Hold key positions in Chilean government
Social Security: The Inherent Contradmiction
Complicit in Chilean restructure based on market
ideals
Serves in Reagan administration through 1983
Creates Chile pension privatization scheme, contin-
ues to promote pension privatization to countries
worldwide
Dissent on recommendations based on market
values
Advises Reagan/Thatcher, acclaimed by Milton
Friedman
Leninist Strategy
Greater structural reforms/privatization from
IMF/WB
Support Baker plan for loans based on structural
reforms
Former congressman/SS Commissioner becomes
WB president
Runs for president on platform of private accounts
Estimate long-term insolvency
Associate Deputy Attorney General to President G.
H. IV. Bush
Invite largely pro-privatizers to testifx in federal
legislative hearings on reform through 2003
Testifies before Congress; leads Cato's Social
Security Project
Averting the Old Age Crisis
Considers investing trust funds in the stock market
and private accounts
Recommends Advisory Council perform extensive
review of Social Security
Reports have consistently estimated long-term
insolvency through 2007
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Date Actor(s)
1997 SS Council
5 SS Council
members
1998 Trustees
1998 Clinton
1998 CSIS
1998 Clinton
2000 G. IV. Bush
2001 Cato
2001 Bush
Action(s)
First time in history consensus is absent-3
proposals
Support private accounts, affiliated with Cato,
Watson WVatt, and AEI
Through 2004, estimated date of insolvency moves
further into future
"Save Social Security First," year-long forums, pro-
motes investing 12% of trust fund in stock market
Publishes statement supporting 2% of payroll taxes
into private accounts
First White House Conference on Social Security;
many proposals for private accounts
Runs on platform of private accounts
Hosts privatizing Social Security conference
President's Commission-all members must
support private accounts
Cato's Hold 4 luncheon seminars on Social SecurityTanner/Biggs reform on the Hill
2003 John/Heritage
2004 SSA
2003 agenda supports private accounts and advises
using SSA mailings to promote reform as well as
using public Trustees to issue special report on
why reform is necessary, explains private accounts
to public, lawmakers, media for Bush
Primary goal for educating public emphasizes
Social Security problems are serious and require
immediate reform
2004 Cato's Tanner Writes 6.2' solution to reform Social Securitx
2004 Treasury
2004 Bush
2004 Biggs/Cato SSChoice
2004 Blahous
2005 CSIS/Concord
Coalition
2005 AEI
2005 SSA
House Special
2005 Investigation
Division (SID)
Public affairs fact sheet indicates private accounts
are critical for Social Security
Presidential agenda 2004 places privatization of SS
as priority
Appointed by Bush to Associate Commissioner of
SSA
Assistant to President for Economic Policy leads
Bush Social Security agenda
Co-sponsor conference on Social Security reform in
Washington, D.C.
Holds conference on Social Security in support of
private accounts
In apparent support for Bush agenda, changes
public communication to reflect need for SS reform
and private accounts.
Notes changes in SSA public communications
Date Actor(s)
2005 Trustees
2005 Congress
Chairmen
2005 Republican
Conferences
2006 GW. Bush
2006 G. W. Bush
2006 AEI
2006 Heritage
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Action(s)
2005 and 2006 reports estimate earlier dates of
insolvency, assuming slower productivity and im-
migration rates
5 proposals submitted in support of private ac-
counts, I by brainchild of Cato (Sam 1ohnson)
Create guide for Republican congressmen to
promote private accounts
2007 budget proposal includes private accounts
Re-appoints pro-privatization trustees against
Congress and tradition
Over the years demonstrates support for private
accounts through website, books, events, and pub-
lications that it sponsors
Over past several years publishes its stance favor-
ing private accounts on website as well as Issues
2006, stating need for SS reform
2006 CSIS Continues ongoing Global Aging Forums on SS
reform.
Predict action in Congress over next few years on2006 M rrprivate accounts
2007 G. W. Bush
2007 G.W. Bush
2008 budget proposal includes private accounts
Appoints Biggs as Deputy Commissioner of SSA
in an affront to the new Democratic Senate Finance
Chair Max Baucus
While dissension on Social Security's long-term financing
appeared as early as 1977, it took the substantial efforts of
the conservative neoliberals to build the political momentum
necessary to shift the institutional structures of government.
Ideologically structured action (Zald, 2000) around the financ-
ing of Social Security has been seen in the activities of Mr. Bush,
his administration, and Congress. Moreover, the Trustees'
estimation of earlier dates for Social Security insolvency is
consistent with the market ideology.
Yet, it appears that the political alignment for and against
privatization may be shifting. The influence of the IMF in Latin
America and middle income countries has collapsed (Weisbrot,
2006). Chile's President Bachelet has begun to reform the coun-
try's private pension scheme beginning with free health care to
individuals over 60 years of age and adding a national public
safety net to the Social Security program (Sentido.tv Americas,
2006).
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Latin America has experienced an unprecedented long-
term economic growth failure over the last quarter-century
while implementing market policies advocated by the IMF
and World Bank (Weisbrot, 2007). A number of Latin American
countries recently rejected these policies and have elected
governments with an explicit mandate to change economic
policy. This year, the governments of Bolivia, Brazil, Ecuador,
Paraguay, Uruguay, Venezuela, and Colombia have decided to
form a new "Banco del Sur" as an alternative to the IMF, World
Bank, and allied institutions.
In the U.S., a liberal coalition called Americans United for
Change banded together in 2006 to defeat the president's at-
tempts at Social Security privatization (Young, 2007). The co-
alition continues its efforts in the fight against the privatiza-
tion of Medicare. Whereas throughout most of the 1990s and
early 2000s, Republicans staunchly supported private accounts
and Democrats were split on the reform option, currently the
reverse is true (Wayne, 2005a; Wayne & Tollefson, 2007). By
the end of 2006, all top Democrats had signed the "Golden
Promise," a pledge against Social Security privatization initi-
ated by Nancy Pelosi and Harry Reid (Graham, 2006).
The struggle is sure to continue as challengers, including
the president, his administration and political appointees, con-
tinue their unabated framing of Social Security as "bankrupt,"
"unsustainable," and in "crisis." In September 2006, a group
called For Our Grandchildren reacted to the "Golden Promise"
by asking each member of Congress to sign a pledge that they
would require that all reform options (including privatization)
be placed on the table (Koffler, 2006). Undaunted by his defeat
in 2006, Mr. Bush placed private carve-out accounts in the 2008
federal budgets and appointed Andrew Biggs to deputy com-
missioner of the SSA during a congressional recess (Office of
the Press Secretary, 2007; Schor, 2007). Almost every elected
Democrat and many Republicans had rejected Bush's plan to
create private accounts and strongly opposed the appointment.
Max Baucus, Senate Finance Committee Chairman, stated that
the appointment of Biggs, due to his support of Bush's plan,
has dimmed any chance of real reform. In the future, perhaps
the ideological divide will be broken by a savvy policy entre-
preneur or an advocacy coalition. Through early November of
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2007, candidates were mostly quiet about Social Security reform
on the presidential campaign trail, focusing instead on health
care. However, over the Veterans' Day weekend, Republican
candidate Fred Thompson and Democratic candidates Hillary
Clinton and Barack Obama began to debate the issue publicly
(Sahadi, 2007). Thompson proposes personal accounts funded
by additional individual payroll taxes government matched 2.5
to 1 through general revenues. Clinton anticipates first ending
the practice of borrowing from the Social Security trust fund
and then appointing a bipartisan commission. Obama backs
raising the income ceiling on payroll taxes.
Finally, within the SSA, efforts toward shifting the social
insurance program to private accounts continue (SSA, 2007).
SSA sponsored the Retirement Research Consortium in 2003 at
S5.0 million or more per year through 2007. The RRC has three
goals: 1) conducting research and evaluation; 2) disseminating
information on retirement research and 3) training scholars and
practitioners. The RRC has held events at which speakers and
presenters have promoted personal accounts. At a conference
this year, Andrew Biggs and Sylvester Schieber were the two
invited guest speakers. Sylvester Schieber, a partner with the
financial consulting firm of Watson-Wyatt Worldwide, was ap-
pointed last fall by Mr. Bush to the Chairmanship of the Social
Security Advisory Board. Additionally, one of the greatest ob-
jections to personal accounts has been the shift of risk from the
government to the individual. At an RRC conference a year
ago, five papers were presented on the possibility of reducing
the amount of individual risk associated with the introduction
of private accounts into Social Security.
In conclusion, Social Security is important to U.S. citizens.
They support it unequivocally, to the point of consenting to
additional taxes to sustain the program. Conversely, citizens
do not favor the individual risk associated with personal ac-
counts in Social Security. There is a great need for an accurate
depiction of Social Security's status to be brought into na-
tional debate. Market rationalists are prominent in the presi-
dential administration, the Social Security Administration, the
Department of Treasury, the Board of Trustees, and witnesses
invited to congressional hearings on Social Security reform.
Moreover, they have penetrated research institutions previ-
ously perceived as unbiased. In the event of a conservative
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majority in Congress and/or the election of another conserva-
tive president, it is likely that the legislative ambush seen with
the Medicare Modernization Act of 2003 will recur in Social
Security reform in the form of private accounts.
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